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Bixby: Bixby: Participatory Rulemaking in State Government:

Comment
Participatory Rulemaking in State
Government:
A Managed Care Success Story
I.

INTRODUCTION

In June 1997, the Missouri Department of Insurance ("DOI") was presented
with a massive undertaking: implementation of Senate Substitute for Senate
Committee Substitute for House Substitute for House Committee Substitute for
House Bill 335 ("HB 335").1 The bill enacted sweeping reforms of the managed
health care system, incorporating "some of the strongest consumer protections
in the country." 2 Prior to 1997, the DOI's authority over managed care, and
hence its expertise, was limited.3 Furthermore, the bill contained a variety of
controversial and complex issues, so implementation of the legislation was
certain to be difficult both politically and technically.4
The promulgation of rules was to be the primary tool for the
implementation of HB 335.5 In order to promulgate rules that were meaningful,
effective, fair, and in keeping with legislative intent, the DOI established an
extensive participatory process to involve as many interested individuals in the
rulemaking process as possible.6 Although such a process was authorized by
statute in 1997,7 no similar process had previously been used by the DOI.8
This Comment examines the rulemaking process as established by the
Missouri Administrative Procedure Act? and the costs and benefits that an

1. Judith VandeWater, Consumer GroupsPraiseHealth Bill But InsurersPredict
That Costs Will Rise, ST. LOUIs POST-DISPATCH, June 1, 1997, at IE.
2. Id. For a partial list of reforms, see infra note 137.
3. See VandeWater, supranote 1,at 1E.

4. See Dan Balaban, HealthBill Stirs Conflict in Missouri,KAN. CrIY BUS. J., Nov.
3, 1997, at 55.
5. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.

6. Memorandum from Tom Bixby, Director, Division of Consumer Affairs,
Missouri Department of Insurance, to Interested Parties (June 27, 1997) (on file with
author). As the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs for the Missouri
Department of Insurance, the Author was in charge of the implementation of HB 335 for

the DOI. In that position, he chaired the task force meetings, as well as the meetings with
interest groups, and oversaw responses to all correspondence in regard to HB 335. He
was responsible for the content of the regulations promulgated pursuant to HB 335 and
designed the participatory process that is the subject of this Comment.
7. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.026 (Supp. 1999).
8. Nor, to the Author's knowledge, has this process been used by other state
agencies.
9. See MO. REv. STAT. ch. 536 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
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extensive, participatory process for rulemaking may have for state agencies, the
public, and the regulated industry. Specifically, this Comment will focus on the
participatory process leading up to the promulgation of three rules generated as
a result of the passage of HB 335.I ° The participatory process for the three

rules-concerning a standardized credentialing form, the delivery of prescription
drugs, and the adequacy of a Health Maintenance Organization's ("HMO's")
network of health care providers-yielded very different experiences. In
general, the process was invaluable to the DOI in the development of
implementing rules and is highly recommended to agencies considering rules to
put into effect legislative enactments.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Rulemaking Generally
Whereas the federal and state Constitutions divide government into three
branches with distinct governance functions," administrative agencies often
perform all three of these functions.' 2 Administrative agencies are generally
charged with implementing and enforcing laws under their jurisdiction, and so
perform an executive function. 3 Administrative agencies are also often required
to adjudicate the rights of individuals in specific cases, and thus perform a quasijudicial function. 4 Furthermore, administrative agencies are at times granted
discretionary power from the legislative branch, and consequently also take on
a quasi-legislative function. 5 The ability to use each of the three types of
governmental functions has allowed administrative agencies to "more
expeditiously develop and enforce policies."' 6 However, this concentration of
powers has generated concerns about anti-democratic governance in which
"unelected bureaucrats accumulate enormous policy and law-making
discretion."17 These concerns have led administrative law to focus on agency

10. Sixteen different rules have been generated as a result of the passage of HB
335. See supranote 148 and accompanying text.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I (federal legislative powers); U.S. CONST. art. II (federal
executive power); U.S. CONST. art. III. (federal judicial power); see also MO. CONST. art.
II, § 1 (state separation of powers provisions).
12. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 4 (1994).
13. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY
62 (1993).
14. Id.
15. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4

(1993).
16. Id.
17. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 5 (1990).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3
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structures and processes designed to ensure that agencies do not use their power
inappropriately.' s
Administrative agencies generally make policy by using one (or both) of
two models of law-making processes. 9 "Incremental" lawmaking is based on
the adjudicatory resolution of individual cases.2
Under this process,
"policymaking is piecemeal and tightly restricted in scope."' The second
process by which agencies create policy is "comprehensive rationality," more
commonly known as rulemaking. 2 Pure comprehensive rationality requires (1)
that an agency "identify all possible methods of reaching" its specific objective,
(2) that it evaluate each possible method, and (3) that it choose the method best
suited to achieving its objective.24 Practically speaking, pure comprehensive
rationality is extremely difficult to achieve.' In addition to the objective of
thorough consideration of all options, "[w]e want government administration to
be workable, effective, efficient, and economical... [as well as] acceptable to
the community at large."26 Consequently, the agency rulemaking process
requires trade-offs between different objectives in order to produce the
"optimum administrative law-making process."
To promulgate a rule, an agency must have some degree of discretionary
power granted to it from the legislature.2" The legislature grants such power in
order to meet a particular need of the legislature.' First, rulemaking may
"provide the essential details of our law."3' Rules may fill the gaps where the
legislature "is unwilling or unable to write laws specific enough to be
implemented by government agencies and complied with by private citizens."'"
Second, rulemaking allows the legislature "to remain vague, leaving the specific,
'
painful, and politically dangerous decisions to the agencies."32
Finally, the

18. Id. at 3.
19. See ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING 6 (1986).
20. Id. at 5.
21. Colin S.Diver, PolicymakingParadigmsin AdministrativeLaw, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 393, 399 (1981).
22. Id. at 396.
23. See BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 12.

24. Diver, supranote 21, at 396.
25. See BONFIELD, supra note 19, at 7-8. Although comprehensive rationality
"do[es] not often exist in [its] pure and uncompromising form[ ],"
the bulk of the benefits
of comprehensive rationality may be attained through rulemaking without incurring too
great a cost. BONFIELD, supra note 19, at 6-7.

26.

BONFIELD,

supranote 19, at 8.

27. BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 8.

28. See BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 20-21.
29. See AMAN & MAYTON, supranote 15, at 10-11.
30. KERWIN, supranote 12, at 2.
31. KERW]N, supranote 12, at 2.
32. KERWIN, supra note 12, at 32.
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rulemaking process allows the legislature to "gain the advantage of policy
development by professionals," where the legislature develops "the rudiments
of a solution" to a problem,
and then "turn[s] the program... over to an agency
33
... for implementation."
Agency rulemaking authority parallels these legislative needs. Under state
administrative procedure acts, an administrative agency must implement,
interpret,orprescribethe details of a law established by the legislature.' When
a rule implements a law, the policy behind the law has been fully developed by
the legislature, and the rule merely instructs the public on how to comply. 3 This
meets the need of the legislature to "provide the essential details of the law."36
When a rule interpretsthe law, it clarifies, explains, or describes a standard of
conduct required by the legislation. 7 Agency interpretation allows the
legislature to "remain vague," leaving the agency with the difficult decisions.38
When a rule prescribesthe details of a law, it does so because the legislature
"establishes the goals of... statutes but provides few details as to how [the
'
goals] are to be put into operation or how they are actually to be achieved."39
Allowing an agency to prescribe the details of the law enables the legislature to

set broad policy goals without filling inall of the details.4"
The process for rulemaking in administrative agencies serves two broad
purposes. First, decisional processes of rulemaking are designed to be
"participatory (open to persons likely to be affected by the proposed rule) and
comprehensive ([addressing] the range of interests at stake in a proposed rule)."'
Second, the process is designed to ensure agency compliance with the rule of
law concept.42 The rule of law requires clearly established rules so that the
public may more readily understand and comply with the law.43
The decisional processes ofrulemaking are designed to be participatory and
comprehensive for a variety of reasons. First, "[p]ublic participation in rule
making ... helps to ensure that non-representative bodies of rule makers make
responsive and responsible rules." Second, participation in rulemaking serves
an important infomational function.45 Information from and critical analysis by
affected parties can prove invaluable to an agency attempting to develop
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

KERWIN, supranote 12, at 11-12.
See BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 89.

See KERWIN, supranote 12, at 5.
KERWIN, supranote 12, at 2.

See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 15, at 88.
KERWIN, supranote 12, at 34.
KERWIN, supra note 12, at 6.
See KERWIN, supra note 12, at 11-12.
41. AMAN & MAYTRON, supra note 15, at 41.
42. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 15, at 41.

43. See BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 107.
44. BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 184.
45. KERWIN, supranote 12, at 34.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3
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policy. ' Administrative agencies frequently have insufficient information and
background necessary to write effective rules.47 Furthermore, "broad citizen
participation provides agencies with a basis of comparison to check the accuracy
of information proffered by regulated groups."'
Such participation gives
opponents49of the agency proposal a fair and complete opportunity to voice their
concerns.

In addition to enhanced accountability and increased information flow,
public participation'lelp[s] rulemaking agencies plan for the circumstances they
will confront when ...
implementation... begins.""0 Generally, "[i]nput during
the initial stages of the rulemaking process from sources outside the agency may
prevent the development of subsequent legal, technical, or political problems for
the agency."'" Circumstances for which an agency must plan include a negative
reaction to an unpopular rule s2 and the likelihood and nature of a lawsuit
challenging the rule.53 Furthermore, effective enforcement plans and monitoring
systems must be designed.54 Participation in rulemaking helps the agency
address each of these problems."5
An additional benefit of public participation in the mlemaking process is the
prevention or perception of "agency capture. '5 6 Agency capture occurs when
agency personnel, for any of a variety of reasons, adopt the regulated industry's
point of view rather than maintaining an objective, detached perspective. 7 The
decisional processes of rulemaking are designed to be "a cure for the myopia of
the... administrator, unable to see beyond the parties before him to the full
range of public interests affected by his decisions.""8
Finally, the participation of opposing interests in the rulemaking process
may "lead to bargaining, [where] the rules produced reflect[] compromises
generally acceptable to all."' 9 This type of outcome enhances the legitimacy of
the rulemaking process'0 and makes the adoption "of unnecessary, unsound, or
otherwise undesirable rules" less likely.6'

46. See AMAN &MAYTON, supra note 15, at 45.
47. See AMAN &MAYrON, supra note 15, at 45.
48. BONFIELD, supra note 19, at 182.
49. See BONFIELD, supra note 19, at 182.
50. KERWIN, supra note 12, at 162.

51. BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 157.
52. See BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 183.
53. See KERWiN, supranote 12, at 163.
54. See KERWIN, supra note 12, at 162.
55. See KERWIN, supranote 12, at 10.
56. BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 184.
57. See SHAPIRO &TOMAIN, supranote 13, at 12, 113.
58. Diver, supranote 21, at 424.
59. BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 185.
60. See KERNVIN, supra note 12,at 161.
61. BONFIELD, supra note 19, at 150.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Public participation in the rulemaking process is not, however, devoid of
problems.62 First, in order to participate effectively in the rulemaking process,
an interest group must be well-organized, able to devote substantial resources to
the project, and fairly sophisticated. 63 As a result, "industry and trade
associations tend to be overrepresented in regulatory politics, and small
producers and consumers tend to be underrepresented." Furthermore, interest
groups that do participate in the rulemaking process are often less interested in
producing a good rule than they are in taking "extreme positions," providing
results of "defensive research," and taking other steps designed solely to protect
the narrow interests of their constituents.65
Accommodating an extensive public participation process can be
cumbersome and costly to the promulgating agency.' The agency must collect,
analyze, consider, and respond to comments. Such a process, particularly one
involving a complex rule or participation by a large number of individuals (or
both), is time-consuming and costly. 67 In addition, when considering high
profile, controversial issues, public participation may "place the agency squarely
between6 powerful contending forces," creating political ramifications for the
agency.
Another potential problem with public participation in the rulemaking
process is that "[fjormal mechanisms for participation, such as written comment
and public hearings, [may] become stylized rituals from which neither side
expects much more than an affirmation of what is already known." 69 If an
agency views participatory mechanisms as a mere formality, then the benefits of
public participation in the rulemaking process will be lost. Thus, mechanisms
to increase public participation are a means to achieve greater accountability,70
better information, and a better rulemaking process, not ends unto themselves.
The second major function of the rulemaking process is to ensure
compliance with the rule of law.7 ' First, the rule of law requires that laws be
clearly established to enable one to have "the practical capacity.., to order her
life and business." 72 Government "owes a duty to define the conditions under
which conduct.., would be [illegal] so that [the public] will have an inkling as
to what they can lawfully do rather than be in a state of complete

62. See KERWIN, supranote 12, at 89-90.
63. See KERWIN, supranote 12, at 114.
64. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 13, at 111.
65. KERWIN, supranote 12, at 115-16.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See AMAN & MAYTON, supranote 15, at 58.
See KERWIN, supranote 12, at 115.
KERWIN, supranote 12, at 163.
KERWIN, supranote 12, at 116.
See BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 10-11.
71. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 15, at 41.
72. AMAN & MAYTON, supranote 15, at 69.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3
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' Second, the rule of law requires rules to be general in their
unpredictability."73
application: "[a] rule will not say that Jones may not drive faster than sixty-five

miles per hour. Rather it will say that no one can." 7 4

At the state level,

therefore, the formal promulgation of rules is required whenever an agency

makes a policy "statement that is of general applicability." 5 A "statement of
general applicability" is any statement of policy "directed at a class by
description, that is directed at all persons similarly situated, rather than at

named individuals."76

B. The MissouriRulemaking Process
The Missouri Constitution provides that "[a]ll rules and regulations of any
...

administrative agency of the executive department... shall take effect not
secretary of state." 77

less than 10 days after the filing thereof in the office of the

The Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that the

"[p]romulgation of rules and regulations is an executive function."7 " Although,
rulemaking is a function of the executive branch, legislative authority must be

granted to an administrative agency before it can promulgate rules.79
Furthermore, rules "must be promulgated within the scope of the legislative
authority conferred upon the state agency or [they] ... are void. They are also
void if they attempt to modify or extend the statutes.""0 The grant of legislative
authority may be express or implied."
Missouri, like most states, has adopted an Administrative Procedure Act
that establishes (among other things) the process by which administrative

73. AMAN &MAYTON, supra note 15, at 69 (quoting E.I. Dupont De Nemours &
Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984)).
74. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 15, at 70.
75. BONFIELD, supra note 19, at 77. This is not always the case for rules
promulgated by the federal government. See BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 77.
76. BONFIELD, supra note 19, at 75.
77. Mo. CONsT. art. IV, § 16.
78. Missouri Coalition for the Env't v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d
125, 133 (Mo. 1997); see also Pharmflex, Inc. v. Division of Employment See., 964
S.W.2d 825, 829 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
79. See State ex rel. Royal Ins. v. Director of the Mo. Dep't of Ins., 894 S.W.2d
159, 161 (Mo. 1995).
80. -Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Angoff, 937 S.W.2d 277, 282 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996).
81. See Pen-Yan Inv., Inc. v. Boyd Kan. City, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 299,304 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997). However, an agency "cannot infer a power from a statute simply because
that power would facilitate the accomplishment of an end deemed beneficial." Id. "A
power may be implied 'only if it necessarily follows from the language of the statute."'
Id. (quoting Brooks v. Pool-Leffler, 636 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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agencies are required to adopt rules.82 The Missouri Administrative Procedure
Act ("MoAPA") defines a rule as any "agency statement of general applicability
that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy."3 In short, any policy
an administrative agency wishes to generally apply, must be promulgated in
accordance with MoAPA.8
The consequences of applying a "rule" (a policy of general applicability)
without adhering to the formalities of MoAPA are clear: the rule is invalid 5 and,
if the agency had been notified in writing prior to the application of the "rule,"
the agency "shall" be required to pay reasonable attorney's fees to the offended
party. 6 Rulemaking under MoAPA requires that "statement[s] of general
applicability" be expressed in a rule." Furthennore, MoAPA provides effective
remedies to those who are wronged by an agency's failure to do so.8"

82. See Mo. REv. STAT. cl. 536 (1994 & Supp. 1999); see also BONFIELD, supra
note 19, at 19.
83. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010(4) (1994). The definition explicitly includes an
amendment or repeal of an existing rule. The definition also provides for several
exceptions not relevant here.
84. See NME Hosps., Inc. v. Department of Soc. Servs., 850 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Mo.
1993). Missouri courts also require that a "rule" have the "potential, however slight, of
impacting the substantive or procedural rights of some member of the public" before
obligating an agency to go through the rulemaking process for a statement of general
applicability. Baugus v. Director of Revenue, 878 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Mo. 1994) (holding
that placing the word "prior" before the word "salvage" on titles of vehicles that had been
reconstructed, although a statement of general applicability, and therefore a "rule," was
not void for failure to follow MoAPA procedures because the term did "not substantially
affect the legal rights of any party." Id.
85. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.014 (Supp. 1999); Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.1

(Supp. 1999) ("No rule shall hereafter be proposed, adopted, amended or rescinded"
without following procedures set out in MoAPA.); Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.5 (Supp.

1999) ("If the state agency fails to file the order of'rulemaking as indicated in [MoAPA],
the proposed rule shall lapse and shall be null, void and unenforceable."); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 536.021.7 (Supp. 1999) ("Except as [otherwise provided], any rule, or
amendment or recission thereof, shall be null, void and unenforceable unless made in
accordance with the provisions of [MoAPA]."); Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.024.1 (Supp.
1999) ("[T]he granting of... rulemaking authority and the validity of... rules and

regulations is contingent upon the agency complying with the provisions of [MoAPA].");
see also State v. Peters, 729 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that state's
method for analyzing blood of allegedly drunk driver was invalid for failure to comply
with MoAPA).
86. Mo.REv. STAT. § 536.021.9 (Supp. 1999). Attorney's fees in such a case are
to be limited to "the amount in controversy in the original action." Mo. REV. STAT. §
536.021.9 (Supp. 1999).
87. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.014 (Supp. 1999).
88. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.9 (Supp. 1999).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3
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To retain some control over the rulemaking process, the Missouri General
Assembly established the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules ("JCAR")."9
JCAR is a permanent committee made up of five members of the House of

Representatives and five members of the Senate. 9 Prior to 1997, JCAR had
statutory authority to initiate a "legislative veto."9' However, in February 1997,
the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that the "legislative veto" was an invalid
usurpation of executive power by the legislative branch, and a violation of the
presentment clause of the Missouri Constitution.' As a result of this decision,
the General Assembly established a new statutory scheme93 that relied on an

89. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.024 (Supp. 1999).
90. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.037.1 (Supp. 1999).
91. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.024.2 (1994); Kenneth D. Dean, Legislative Veto of
A dministrativeRules in Missouri: A ConstitutionalVirus, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1158 (1992).
A "legislative veto" is "a scheme authorizing [the] legislature[ ] to invalidate or suspend
particular agency rules by means other than the enactment of a statute." BONFIELD, supra
note 19, at 497-98. Although originally designed to review agency rules, JCAR (in some
instances) was later given "breathtaking" power to permanently suspend a rule, subject
only to the legislature overruling the committee's decision. Dean, supra, at 1161-64,
1215. The Dean article criticizing the legislative veto is "recommended to any serious
student of administrative and constitutional law." Missouri Coalition for the Env't v.
Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 133 n.17 (Mo. 1997). The legislative
veto as established prior to 1997 "mocks the concept of political accountability" in the
rulemaking process. Dean, supra,at 1202. "Far more political accountability already
exists for most agencies because they must report to the governor, who is accountable to
[all] the people" whereas JCAR is made up often legislators with comparatively narrow
constituencies. Dean, supra,at 1202. The legislative veto has been criticized as "unduly
aggrandiz[ing] the legislative authority at the expense of the executive branch," thereby
weakening the governor. BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 507. Because unlawful rules may
be attacked judicially (with a provision for attorney's fees in Missouri, see Mo. REV.
STAT. § 536.050.3 (Supp. 1999)), the primary effect of a legislative veto will be attacks
on lawful rules. In Missouri, this would give JCAR power to restrict the scope of
legislative acts duly passed with the approval (or over the veto) of the governor. See
Dean, supra,at 1204. This power would upset the system of checks and balances set out
in the state constitution. See BONFIELD, supra note 19, at 507-08. Perhaps most
importantly, a legislative veto "may be more susceptible to undue influence by special
interest groups seeking action inconsistent with the political will of the entire body politic
and contrary to public interest" than is the agency rulemaking process. BONFIELD, supra
note 19, at 508. Finally, the legislative veto may encourage some interests to limit or
entirely forego their participation in the agency rulemaking process, seeking to defeat a
rule they oppose through the legislative veto. Such a result would defeat the purpose of

a participatory rulemaking process, and make the process less effective and valuable. See
BONFIELD, supra note 19, at 508; see also Dean, supra, at 1204.
92. Missouri Coalition for the Env't v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d
125, 133 (Mo. 1997).
93. See H.B. 850, 89th Leg. (Mo. 1997). The process applies to state agencies.
See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.1 (Supp. 1999). "State agency" is defined as "each board,
commission, department, officer or other administrative office or unit of the state other
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Executive Order and statutory provisions contingent upon future events to
recreate the legislative veto.94 Under this new legislative veto provision, JCAR
remains a pivotal actor in the rulemaking process.95
The new scheme makes parsing the guidelines for rulemaking somewhat
difficult.' The scheme in effect at the time rulemaking for HB 335 took place,
allows an administrative agency to seek informal public comment prior to
initiating the formal rulemaking process. 97 This informal input may consist of
the solicitation of comments on rules an agency is considering, and the
appointment of committees "to comment on the subject matter of a rule that the
agency is considering proposing."'' The informal process is entirely at the
99
option of the agency.
The formal rulemaking process begins with the filing of a "notice of
proposed rulemaking" with the Secretary of State.' 0 The notice must also be
filed with JCAR.'0 ' This notice must include:
(1) an explanation of the rule (or change in the rule);
(2) reasons for the rule (or change in the rule);
(3) the agency's legal authority for promulgating the rule (or change in the
rule);
(4) the text of the entire rule (or changes to the existing rule);
(5) notice of where and how a person can comment on the proposed
rule; 10 2 and

than the general assembly, the courts, the governor or a political subdivision of the state,

existing under the constitution or statute, and authorized... to make rules." Mo. REV.
STAT. § 536.010(5) (1994). Certain aspects of the process do not apply to the Public
Service Commission and the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. See Mo. REV.
STAT. § 536.024.6 (Supp. 1999). Furthermore, for certain issues, the Director of the
Department of Social Services need not promulgate rules, see Mo. REV. STAT. §536.043
(Supp. 1999), and the process need not be applied to "letter rulings" of the Department
of Revenue. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.10 (Supp. 1999).
94. Exec. Order No. 97-97 (1997) (on file with Mo. Secretary of State); see, e.g.,
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.016, .019, .028 (Supp. 1999).
95. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.024.2-.3 (Supp. 1999); Exec. Order No. 97-

97 3 (1997) (on file with Mo. Secretary of State).
96. In addition to having statutes effective based on a future contingency, see supra
note 94, the scheme, for example, makes Executive Order No. 97-97 pivotal to the
rulemaking process in effect when the contingent statutes are not in effect. However, the
only explicit mention in the statutes of Executive Order No. 97-97 is in those contingent
statutes. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.016, .019, .028 (Supp. 1999).
97. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.026.1-.2 (Supp. 1999).
98. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.026.1-.2 (Supp. 1999).
99. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.026.1-.2 (Supp. 1999).

100. Mo. REV. STAT. §536.021.1 (Supp. 1999).
101. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.024.2 (1999); Exec. Order No. 97-97
(on file with Mo. Secretary of State).
102. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.2 (Supp. 1999).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3
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(6) a fiscal note, estimating the cost of the rule to government agencies' °3
and to private parties.'"
The notice is to be published by the Secretary of State in the Missouri Register
"as soon as practicable after the filing" of the rule by the agency."'
MoAPA establishes a minimum comment period of thirty days after
publication in the Missouri Register of the notice of proposed rulemaking.'0 In
addition, the agency may hold a public hearing on the proposed rule "but no such
hearing shall be necessary unless otherwise required by law.""0 7 A final order
of rulemaking must be submitted to JCAR within sixty days of the end of the
comment period or the hearing.' The final order must also be submitted to the
Secretary of State within ninety days"° unless "the final order of rulemaking has
been disapproved by [JCAR]."" The final order of rulemaking must contain:
(1) an explanation of any changes made to the final rule from the
proposed rule;
(2) reasons for any such changes;
(3) "[t]he full text of any section or subsection of the rule as adopted
which has been changed from that contained in the notice of proposed
rulemaking";
(4) a summary of comments and (if applicable) hearing testimony;
(5) an explanation of the "agency's findings with respect to the merits of
any such testimony or comments which are opposed in whole or in
part to the proposed rule"; and
(6) the agency's legal authority for promulgating the rule."'

103. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.200.1 (1994). If the cost to government agencies

is expected to be less than $500 an affidavit to that effect from the department director
will suffice.
104. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.205.1 (1994). A private entity fiscal note is not
necessary if the anticipated cost to private entities is expected to be less than $500.
105. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.1 (Supp. 1999). The Missouri Register is to be
published "no less frequently than monthly by the secretary of state." Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 536.015 (1994). Copies of the Missouri Register are to "be made available to the
public... for a reasonable charge... not to exceed the actual cost of publishing and
delivery." Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.033.1 (1994).
106. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.2(5) (Supp. 1999).
107. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.3 (Supp. 1999).
108. Section 536.024.3 requires that a final order of rulemaking cannot be filed
with the Secretary of State until 30 days after filing with JCAR. Mo. REV.

STAT. §

536.024.3 (Supp. 1999). Section 536.021.5 requires that a final order of rulemaking be
filed with the Secretary of State within 90 days of the end of the comment period or the
hearing. Therefore, to comply with both provisions, an agency must file with JCAR

within 60 days of the end of the comment period or the hearing. Mo. REV. STAT. §
536.021.5 (Supp. 1999).
109. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.5 (Supp. 1999).

110. Exec. Order No. 97-97 3 (1997) (on file with Mo. Secretary of State).
111. Mo.REV. STAT. §536.021.5 (Supp. 1999).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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After the final order of rulemaking has been filed with and published by the
Secretary of State, the entire rule as finally adopted by the agency must be
published in the Code of State Regulations." 2 The rule then becomes effective
on the "thirtieth day after the date of publication of the... Missouri code of state
regulations.' 13 If it is later determined that a rule is invalid, the party
successfully challenging the rule "shall be awarded reasonable fees and
expenses."",14

Alternatively, if JCAR disapproves a final order of rulemaking within thirty
days of receiving the filing, then the administrative agency "[s]hall hold in
abeyance for thirty (30) legislative days [the] final order of rulemaking."' "5
Furthermore, the Secretary of State is prohibited from publishing the final order
of rulemaking prior to the expiration of the thirty legislative days. ' 6 If, during
the thirty legislative days, the legislature passes a concurrent resolution
disapproving the rule, and opponents garner a two-thirds vote in each house,
then the agency "[s]hall give force and effect" to the resolution, and the rule will
17
fail.'
MoAPA, therefore, addresses the decisional processes goals of rulemaking,
namely that a process must be comprehensive and participatory." 8 "The very
purpose of the notice procedure for a proposed rule [under MoAPA] is to allow

112. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.8 (Supp. 1999). The Code of State Regulations is
to be published "from time to time... as determined by the secretary of state." Mo. REV.
STAT. § 536.031 (1994). Copies of the Code of State Regulations are to "be made
available to the public.., for a reasonable charge... not to exceed the actual cost of
publishing and delivery." Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.033.1 (1994).
113. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.021.8 (Supp. 1999).

114. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.050.3 (Supp. 1999).
115. Exec. Order No. 97-97 3 (1997) (on file with Mo. Secretary of State); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 536.028.1 (Supp. 1999). A "legislative day" is a day on which the
legislature is in session.
116. Section 536.021.1 prohibits the publication of any final order of rulemaking
that fails to comply with procedures set out in Section 536.024 "or an executive order,
whichever appropriately applies." Presumably, this reference is to Executive Order No.
97-97. Nevertheless, Section 536.021.1 explicitly prohibits the Secretary of State from
publishing a final order ofrulemaking that has been disapproved by concurrent resolution
of the legislature or one that is the subject of a concurrent resolution. See Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 536.021.1, .024 (Supp. 1999).
117. Exec. Order No. 97-97 4 (1997) (on file with Mo. Secretary of State).
Although the concurrent resolution must first be presented to the Governor for his
signature (in which case only a majority in each house must vote for the resolution), this
outcome is unlikely. Administrative agencies are part of the Executive Branch, and
therefore most agency heads work for the Governor. Presumably, if the Governor wanted
to prevent a particular rule from becoming effective, he/she could find a more direct
method than signing a concurrent resolution of the legislature.
118. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 15, at 41; see also supra text
accompanying notes 44-61.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3
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opportunity for comment by supporters or opponents of the measure, and so to
induce a modification."'" 9 The process set out in MoAPA is comprehensive,
providing an opportunity for all interested parties to offer input to the rulemaking
agency. If the agency views public comment as more than a mere "stylized
ritual,"'' 0 then MoAPA provides a process that is also participatory.
Similarly, MoAPA addresses rule of law concerns in the rulemaking
process.21 The MoAPA requirement that any "statement of general
applicability"'" be promulgated and published as a formal rule is a rule of law
concept."' The provision requires that rules be published, thereby helping to
ensure that the public can more easily understand and comply with the law. 4
If an agency attempts to apply a "rule" without first having properly promulgated
it, MoAPA provides ample protection for the public by declaring any such rule
void,"z and providing for legal fees for an aggrieved party." Furthermore, if an
agency first promulgates a rule that is subsequently challenged and found to be
invalid (apparently on any grounds), the adverse party is again entitled to
expenses and legal fees. 2 7

119. St. Louis Christian Home v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights, 634 S.W.2d
508, 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (citations omitted); see also NME Hosps., Inc. v.
Department of Soc. Servs., 850 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Mo. 1993).
120. KERWIN, supranote 12, at 116.
121. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 15, at 41.

122. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010(4) (1994).
123. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.5 (Supp. 1999).
124. See BONFIELD, supra note 19, at 107.

125. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.021.5 (Supp. 1999).
126. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.9 (Supp. 1999).
127. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.050.3 (Supp. 1999). Under MoAPA an agency can
illegally apply a rule of general applicability in two ways. First, it can apply the rule
without first properly promulgating the rule under MoAPA. See Mo. REV. STAT. §
536.021.9 (Supp. 1999). Second, an agency can promulgate a rule, using the proper
procedures, for which it has no authority. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.050.3 (Supp. 1999).
The former Section 536.021.9 has two limitations not found in Section 536.050.3. First,
the former is limited to legal fees, as opposed to "fees and expenses"; second, the former
is limited to "the amount in controversy," whereas no such limitation exists for the latter
statute. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.021.9, .050.3 (Supp. 1999). In combination, the
statutes clearly create the incentive for an agency not to act at all if unsure about its
authority. However, where an agency wishes to pursue a policy for which its authority
is unclear, the statutes seem to create an odd incentive to not promulgate the rule,
because the consequences of having a court determine the agency was wrong are less
severe.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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RULEMAKINGPROCESS FoRHB 335

In early 1997, the Missouri General Assembly debated'

and passed

sweeping reform of how managed care was to be delivered in the State of
Missouri. ' The bill included "some of the strongest consumer protections in the
country""'3 yet passed both Houses of the Legislature by "lopsided," bipartisan
margins: 140-15 in the House, and 33-1 in the Senate.'
Governor Mel
Carnahan called HB 335, "the legislative miracle of the session."' The bill was
the result of work done by an interim committee that held a series of hearings

throughout the prior year, 11 out of which developed a "diverse coalition...
[that] produced consensus among urban and rural, Democratic and Republican
legislators.' 3' The overwhelming margins by which the legislation passed
occurred despite "fierce[ ] opposition to the bill" from36 managed care
companies'

3

'

and "intense opposition" from business groups.'

128. See Virgihia Young, BipartisanForces Trying to Regulate Managed Care,
ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Feb. 16, 1997, at 8D.
129. See VandeWater, supra note 1, at IE.
130. VandeWater, supra note 1, at IE (quoting Geri Dallek, Director of Health
Policy at Families, U.S.A., a health advisory organization in Washington, D.C.). For a
partial list of reforms, see infra note 137.
131. VandeWater, supra note 1, at 1E.
132. Scott Charton, ManagedCareLaw Aimed at 'Abuses ; CarnahanSigns Bill,
PraisesCooperation,ST. LOUIS POST-DiSPATCH, June 26, 1997, at 4B.
133. See Nicole Ziegler, House Cheers Health Care Bill, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, May 15, 1997, at 2B.
134. Young, supra note 128, at 8D.
135. Ziegler, supra note 133, at 2B.
136. Young, supra note 128, at 8D.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3
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In addition to a variety of consumer protections,' 37 HB 335 made a
significant public policy shift in that it gave "the Department of Insurance
tremendous authority to regulate managed care companies" where no such
authority had previously existed.' 3' Faced with this new authority, the DOI
lacked the type of expertise necessary to properly address some of the issues
raised in the legislation. Given the lack of expertise and the controversial nature
of many of the provisions of HB 335, the DOI determined that it would be
prudent to solicit input from interested parties concerning the implementation of
HB 335 through an inclusive participatory rulemaking process.' 39
Two days after Governor Carnahan signed 1B 335, the participatory
rulemaking process began when the DOI sent a questionnaire to all interested
parties requesting feedback on a variety of issues concerning the legislation."4
The DOI then held a public hearing on RB 335 and, subsequently, established
nine task forces focusing on different aspects of the bill.' 4' Each task force was

137. See Charton, supra note 132. Consumer protections provided by the
legislation include the following requirements:
(1) a prohibition on retracting authorization forhealth services once given, except
in a few narrow circumstances, Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.1361.13 (Supp. 1999);
(2) emergency services must be covered if a prudent layperson under the
circumstances would have thought it necessary to go to the emergency room,
Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.1367 (Supp. 1999);
(3) the DOI's resolution to grievances filed by consumers against their managed
care companies would be binding, Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.1387.1 (Supp.
1999);
(4) HMOs must have adequate networks of health care providers within
reasonable distances of consumers' homes, Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.603.1
(Supp. 1999);
(5) health care providers are prohibited from billing consumers for covered
services where an HMO failed to pay, Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.606.2 (Supp.
1999); and
(6) an HMO must continue to cover services from a health care provider for a
pregnant patient, a person with a disability, or a life-threatening illness for up
to 90 days after the provider is no longer in an HMO's network if continuity
of care is medically necessary and prudent for that patient. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 354.612 (Supp. 1999).
138. VandeWater, supra note 1, at IE (quoting John O'Rourke, Chief Executive
of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Missouri and its for-profit subsidiary, RightChoice
Managed Care). Although the Department of Health ("DOll") had some responsibility
for the implementation of HB 335, the vast majority of the legislation was the
responsibility of the Department of Insurance ("DOI"). See H.B. 335, 89th Leg. (Mo.
1997); see also Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6.
139. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6.
140. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supra note 6, at 2.
141. Memorandum from Tom Bixby, Director, Division of Consumer Affairs,
Missouri Department of Insurance, to Interested Parties 1 (July 17, 1997) (on file with
author).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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composed of interested parties representing various points of view. 142 Moreover,
each task force held several public meetings. 143 The task forces were designed
to "give advice to the Department of Insurance (DOI), help [it] to understand
how the [health care] system works 'in the real world', and to help with the
interpretation of the legislation and the writing of the rules."' 44 The vote of each
task force was purely advisory. 14 1 In addition, DOI staff held many private

meetings with various interest groups and interested individuals.' ' The DOI
also posted memoranda and drafts of proposed rules on its website and
maintained a mailing list of 300 interested parties. 4 7
Eventually, the DOI promulgated sixteen rules pursuant to HB 335.' The
participatory rulemaking process established for three of these rules is the subject
of this Comment. The three rules selected correspond to the three categories of
149
rulemaking that relate to legislative goals for granting rulemaking authority.'
Specifically, the "Standard Form to Establish Credentials" ("Standardized
Credentialing Form")' 50 involved a situation in which the legislature granted the
DOI rulemaking authority to implement the law; the "Pharmacies and
Prescription Drugs" ("Pharmacy Regulation")'' involved a situation in which
the legislature granted the DOI rulemaking authority to interpretthe law; and the
"Provider Network Adequacy Standards" ("Network Adequacy") 5 2 involved a
situation in which the legislature granted the DOI rulemaking authority to
prescribethe details of the law.

142. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (July 17, 1997), supra note 141, at 1.
143. Memorandum from Tom Bixby, Director, Division of Consumer Affairs,
Missouri Department of Insurance, to Interested Parties 1 (July 30, 1997) (on file with
author).
144. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (July 30, 1997), supranote 143, at 1.
145. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (July 30, 1997), supra note 143, at 1.
146. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6.
147. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6.
148. MO. CODE REGS. ANN.tit. 20, §§ 100-4.100, 100-5.010, 100-5.020, 4002.160,400-7.095,400-7.170, 400-7.180,400-7.200,400-7.300, 400-7.400, 400-8.200,
400-10.010, 400-10.020, 400-10.200, 400-10.250, 700-4.100 (1998).
149. See supratext accompanying notes 34-40.
150. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.180 (1998).
151. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.400 (1998).
152. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.095 (1998).
153. These categories are not mutually exclusive and the legislature does not
explicitly grant one type of rulemaking authority over another. See BONFIELD, supra
note 19, at 89-90. Rather, these categories are descriptions that overlap. It is unlikely
that the purpose of a rulemaking procedure would be solely to implement a law without,
for example, any interpretation. The authority for the rules selected are, however,
primarily for the purpose indicated, and so appeared to be the best fit for analyzing the
participatory process. See BONFIELD, supra note 19, at 89-90.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3
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A. StandardizedCredentialingForm
HB 335 provided that the DOI "shall develop a standard credentialing form
which shall be used by all [HMOs] when credentialing health care professionals
ina managed care plan."' "MThe provision was designed to alleviate paperwork
for health care providers who contracted with several different HMOs. Each
HMO had its own credentialing form that asked for similar information in
different formats. Because one HMO would not accept the credentialing form
of another HMO, doctors spent a great deal of time filling out these different
forms. Hence, the goal of the standardized credentialing form was to minimize
the amount of paperwork necessary for health care providers to contract with
more than one HMO.'
The DOI viewed the creation of the standardized credentialing form as an
issue of implementation of the law-the policy of the legislature was fully
developed, and the credentialing form, to be promulgated by rule, would merely
instruct the public on how to comply." 6 It was not practical for the legislature
to set out with specificity the details of the form, which ultimately included
eleven pages of fairly small print. 7 Rulemaking for the standardized
credentialing form was, therefore, an example of the legislature delegating
rulemaking authority to fill in the details of the law so that it would be "specific
enough to be implemented by government agencies and complied with by
private citizens." '
The DOI had no previous experience with credentialing forms nor did it
have expertise in the area.'59 Task force members provided the DOI with
essential information the agency needed in order to develop the credentialing
form."6° For example, three different credentialing forms from HMO

154. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.442.1(15) (Supp. 1999). Health Maintenance
Organizations ("HMOs") contract with health care professionals to provide health care
services to the IMO's enrollees. Prior to offering a contract, the HMO inspects the
health care provider's "credentials" to ensure the provider is qualified. Although this
provision was placed in an odd statutory location-technically, it is one of a long list of

items to be "disclosed in writing" to enrollees and prospective enrollees-there was no
dispute concerning the legislature's actual intent regarding the provision. Mo. REV. STAT
§ 354.442.1 (Supp. 1999). For purposes of the standardized credentialing form, "health

carriers" refers to HMOs. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.600(11) (Supp. 1999). Although
this definition is not controlling for Section 354.442, Sections 354.400 to 354.636 relate
specifically to HMOs, and to no other type of insurer. There was no dispute as to what

the term "health carrier" meant.
155. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6, at 2.
156. See KERWIN, supranote 12, at 5.
157. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.180 (1998).
158. KERWIN, supra note 12, at 2.
159. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6.
160. Memorandum from Debra Schuster, Legal Counsel, Group Health Plan, Inc.,
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representatives proved to be invaluable for the development of the final form
promulgated by the DOI.'
The process also involved considerable negotiation between parties
concerning the type and wording of questions to be included on the form. 62 As
a result of the bargaining, a better form was created that was a result of
agreements among the parties. 63 For example, there was considerable debate
about the extent to which a provider's medical malpractice history should be
required in the credentialing form.'" After much discussion, the participating
HMO representatives eventually agreed to the specific information to be
collected and the specific terminology to be used to collect it.

65

The participatory rulemaking process leading up to the standardized
credentialing form provided the agency with information necessary for the
rulemaking process, and gave competing interests the opportunity to amicably
resolve their differences. The process was successful in terms of the
implementation of the law because it provided the DOI with information,
feedback, and agreed-to-compromises. As a result, the final rule accomplished
the purpose of the statute in a manner acceptable to the regulated industry much
more effectively and efficiently than the traditional MoAPA process alone could
have. Moreover, the form adopted by the DOI provided a basis for standardized
forms in Kansas, Colorado, and Nebraska."

to Standardized Credentialing Task Force Members and Tom Bixby (Aug. 11, 1997) (on
file with author).
161. Memorandum from Debra Schuster, supranote 160.
162. See, e.g., Memorandum from Debra Schuster, supra note 160; Letter from
Cheryl Dillard, Vice President, Public Affairs, HealthNet, to Tom Bixby, Director,
Division of Consumer Affairs, Missouri Department of Insurance (Sept. 2, 1997) (on file
with author).
163. See BONFIELD, supranote 19, at 185.

164. See, e.g., Memorandum from Debra Schuster, supra note 160, at 3;
Memorandum from Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, Credentials Unit, to Tom
Bixby (Sept. 26, 1997) (on file with author). Although doctors' groups objected to the
collection of such information, see, e.g., Letter from Jim Kistler, Government Relations
Coordinator, Missouri Association of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons (Oct. 22, 1997)
(on file with author); Memorandum from [Tom] Holloway, Missouri State Medical
Association, to Tom Bixby (Oct. 17, 1997) (on file with author), the statute did not give
the DOI the authority to limit the nature of information collected, merely to standardize
it. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.442.1(15) (Supp. 1999). Therefore, the relevant debate
was how to collect the information, not whether to do so. See Mo.

CODE REGS.

ANN. tit.

20, § 400-7.180 (1998).
165. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.180 (1998).
166. See Bulletin from Kathleen Sebelius, Commissioner of Insurance, State of
Kansas, to All Managed Care Organizations Authorized to Transact Business in Kansas

(June 18, 1999) <http://www.ksinsurance.orglindustry/bulletins/1999-2.html>.
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B. PharmacyRegulations
One of the last controversial issues to be "resolved" in the legislative
process leading up to the passage of HB 335 was a provision regarding "mail
order pharmacies."167 The dispute boiled down to whether the legislation
required HMOs to allow local, retail pharmacies to dispense lucrative, ninety day
prescriptions, or whether it allowed HMOs to deal only with those pharmacies
willing to give the HMOs deep discounts-primarily, mail-order pharmacies.16
Although the legislation passed with "compromise" language, subsequent
discussions made69 clear that the compromise was really a severe
misunderstanding.
The legislative language was the subject of a "last minute compromise
between business and HMO groups, and doctors and consumer organizations."' 70
The provisions were believed to be among the most expensive in the legislation,
and of great concern to the business community.'
Believing that their
acceptance of the pharmacy compromise removed the last obstacle to the bill's
passage,'72 business leaders asserted that they "would not have agreed to a
compromise that did not accomplish" pharmacy cost containment and flexibility
for employers and HMOs' 73
The pharmacy dispute centered on the interaction of language in two
paragraphs of -B 335274 The first paragraph ("subsection 3") provided:

167. Balaban, supra note 4, at 55. A "mail order pharmacy" delivers prescriptions
by mail. The prescriptions usually are long-term, maintenance prescriptions for 90 days
of medication. Such prescriptions are more profitable for a pharmacy than relatively
short-term prescriptions. Managed care companies often allowed patients to purchase
90-day prescriptions only from a mail order pharmacy. By concentrating all of its longterm prescription business in a single pharmacy, the managed care companies can
command price reductions, but local retail pharmacists lose the opportunity to fill the
more lucrative, long-termprescriptions. Patients choosing to purchase prescriptions from
local pharmacies typically would have to get prescriptions filled three times to get 90
days of medicine and hence pay three copayments. See Balaban, supranote 4, at 55.
168. See Balaban, supra note 4, at 55.
169. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6.
170. Balaban, supra note 4, at 55. The Missouri Pharmacy Association was also
intimately involved. See Letter from James C. Stutz, Executive Director, St. Louis Area
Business Health Coalition, to Marcia (sic) English, Tom Bixby, and Kevin Jones,
Missouri Department of Insurance 3 (Aug. 27, 1997) (on file with author).
171. Letter from James C. Stutz, supra note 170, at 2.
172. Letter from James C. Stutz, supra note 170, at 3. Given the overwhelming
support for the measure (140-15 in the House and 33-1 in the Senate), the Author is
unconvinced that the business community would have been able to prevent the bill from
passing absent the compromise. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
173. Letter from James C. Stutz, supra note 170, at 2.
174. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (July 17, 1997), supranote 141, at 3.
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Every health maintenance organization shall apply the same
coinsurance, copayment and deductible factors to all drug
prescriptions filled by a pharmacy provider who participates in the
health maintenance organization's network if the provider meets the
contract's explicit product cost determination."'
The second paragraph ("subsection 4") of the disputed language stated:
Health maintenance organizations shall not set a limit on the quantity
of drugs which an enrollee may obtain at any one time with a
prescription, unless such limit is applied uniformly to all pharmacy
providers in the health maintenance organization's network." 6
Special interest groups involved in the writing of the legislation interpreted these
two provisions in different ways.'77 The interpretation of this language was the
focus of the DOI's participatory rulemaking process.' 78
The business community and HMO industry argued that these two
provisions should be "read together"'79 and that an IMO had to "uniformly
apply" quantity limits on prescription drugs (subsection 4) only when a
pharmacy had met the "explicit product cost determination" of an HMO's
contract terms (subsection 3).8

In other words, an HMO was not required to

allow a pharmacy to sell ninety day prescriptions unless the pharmacy met the
HMO's low, mail-order contract price. 8'
The Missouri Pharmacy Association ("MPA"), however, argued that
subsection 4 prohibited an HMO from allowing mail-order pharmacies to sell
ninety day prescriptions unless allpharmaciesin the network were allowed to
sell such prescriptions, whether or not they were willing to meet the HMO's low,
mail-order contract price. 2 Furthermore, the MPA interpreted subsection 3 to
mean that once a pharmacy was in an HMO's network, the HMO could not
discriminate against local pharmacies by requiring higher coinsurance,

175. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.535.3 (Supp. 1999).
176. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.535.4 (Supp. 1999).
177. See, e.g., Letter from Richard S. Brownlee I & Sherry L. Doctorian of
Hendren and Andrae, L.L.C., on behalf of the Missouri Chamber of Commerce,
Associated Industries of Missouri, and the St. Louis Area Business Health Coalition, to
Jay Angoff, Director, Missouri Department of Insurance (Jan. 16, 1998) (on file with
author); Letter from Lori Levine & Paul Graham, Carson &Coil, P.C., to Thomas Bixby,
Department of Insurance (Jan. 16, 1998) (on file with author).
178. See Balaban, supranote 4, at 55.
179. Letter from James C. Stutz, supranote 170, at 3.
180. Letter from Brownlee & Doctorian, supra note 177, at 1.
181. Letter from Brownlee &Doctorian, supra note 177, at 1.
182. Letter from Levine & Graham, supranote 177, at 1.
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copayments, or deductibles for one type of
183 pharmacy (i.e., local retail
pharmacies) than for another (i.e., mail-order).
The participatory process for the interpretation of the pharmacy provisions
became very contentious.' For example, one supporter of the HMO/business
position charged that "the proposed regulations [had] no semblance to the reality
of the discussions leading up to the legislation, the compromises agreed to by the
various parties, the common sense construction of the language, and the intent
of the legislation as it was passed."" 5 The MPA was equally determined to
maintain its position. 86 Furthermore, legislators supported both sides of the
issue. 8 7 However, the sponsors of the legislation made it clear that their
intention was for all pharmacies to be able to participate in any ninety day
prescription program, and that the business and HMO groups were attempting
to "change the law in the rulemaking process since they lost" in the legislative
process.'
As a result of the controversy, the participatory rulemaking process
concerning the pharmacy provisions was more extensive and debated than any
of the other rules. 89 For instance, the DOI held substantially more meetings
with interested parties concerning the pharmacy provisions than other proposed
rules, attended a meeting between the opponents of the proposed rule and the
governor's chief-of-staff,190 and attempted to foster a compromise between the
factions.19 In addition, the DOI requested legal opinions from the various
factions to support their positions. 92
The DOI's role in promulgating rules for the pharmacy provisions was to
interpretthe law; 93 this was clearly a case in which the legislature was "vague,
leaving the specific, painful, and politically dangerous decisions to the

183. Letter from Levine & Graham, supra note 177, at 1.

184. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6, at 3.
185. Letter from Pete Edge, CAP Representative, UAW Region 5, to Mark
Stahlhuth, General Counsel, Missouri Department of Insurance 1 (Jan. 14, 1998) (on file

with author).
186. See Balaban, supranote 4, at 55.
187. See Letter from James C. Stutz, supra note 170, at 3; Balaban, supra note 4,
at 55.
188. Balaban, supranote 4, at 55 (quoting Rep. Tim Harlan (D-Columbia)).
189. In one meeting, a lobbyist for business interests heatedly told the Author, who
chaired the meetings, that the lobbyist was going to have him fired for proposing the
rules that were later promulgated.
190. This was the only one of the sixteen rules promulgated pursuant to HB 335
that merited such attention.
191. See Balaban supranote 4, at 55.
192. Letter from Debra K. Schuster, Group Health Plan, Inc., to Tom Bixby,

Missouri Department of Insurance 1 (Jan. 16, 1998) (on file with author).
193. See supranotes 34-40 and accompanying text.
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agencies."'19 4 Despite the fact that the participatory rulemaking process for the
pharmacy provisions was "painful," it did accomplish some of the basic goals
of a decisional process for rulemaking. 95 Although information gathering was
not one of the primary goals of the process for the pharmacy task force,
developing an understanding of how the industry handled prescription drugs was
crucial to writing an intelligible rule."9 Feedback from HMOs, business groups,
and pharmacies was important to this information gathering aspect of the
rulemaking process. Furthermore, the participatory process made it clear that the
DOI should expect a lawsuit on this issue, and allowed the agency to plan for
such an eventuality.197
However, problems in the rulemaking process were evident in the
promulgation of the pharmacy provision rules. The extensive process was timeconsuming and costly for the DOI. 9 ' Although the legislature "place[d] the
agency squarely between powerful contending forces,"' 99 the participatory
process subjected the agency to pressure from those forces for an unnecessarily
prolonged period of time. The participatory process boiled down to a "swearing
match" as to alternative versions of presumed legislative intent.
C. Network Adequacy
Among the more consumer-oriented provisions of HB 335 was the
requirement that HMOs" 0 "maintain a network that is sufficient in number and
types of [health care] providers to assure that all services to enrollees shall be
accessible without unreasonable delay."' The legislature explicitly granted the
DOI broad authority to regulate network adequacy:

194. KERWIN, supranote 12, at 2.
195. See supranotes 41-70 and accompanying text.
196. See KERWIN, supranote 12, at 34. Among other things, the DOI had to gather
information to understand how prescription drugs were sold by pharmacies and covered
by HMOs. Similarly, the DOI had to work out the meaning of such terms as "explicit
product cost determination." Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.535.3 (Supp. 1999).
197. A concern over an expected lawsuit was one of the primary reasons for
requesting legal opinions from the various factions. A lawsuit was ultimately filed
against the rules interpreting the pharmacy provisions. The suit is currently pending. See
Express Scripts v. Wenzel, No. 98-4285-CV-C-5-ECF, 2000 WL 868229 (W.D. Mo.
June 12, 2000).

198. See KERWIN, supranote 12, at 115.
199. KERWIN, supra note 12, at 163.
200. For purposes of Sections 354.600 to 354.636, the term "health carrier" is

frequently used. "Health carrier" is defined as "a health maintenance organization
established pursuant to Sections 354.400 to 354.636, RSMo." Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.600
(11) (Supp. 1999).
201. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.603.1 (Supp. 1999).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3

22

2000]

Bixby: Bixby: Participatory Rulemaking in State Government:
MANAGED CARE R ULEMAKING

Sufficiency shall be determined by the director [of the DOI] in
accordance with the requirements of this section and by reference to
any reasonablecriteria,including but not limited to, provider-enrollee
ratios by specialty, primary care provider-enrollee ratios, geographic
accessibility, reasonable distance accessibility criteria for pharmacy
and other services, waiting times for appointments with participating
providers, hours of operation, and the volume of technological and
specialty services available. 22
The primary enforcement tool was to be an "access plan... for each of the
managed care plans that the [HIMO] offers in this state."203 The format for access
plans was to be defined by rule of the DOI. 2° ' IMOs would then be required to
submit access
plans which the DOI has the authority to "approve or
205
disapprove."
The legislature established its goal regarding network adequacy, but
"provide[d] few details as to how [the goals] [were] to be put into operation or
how they [were] actually to be achieved."20 6 Therefore, the object of the
rulemaking process for network adequacy was to prescribethe details of the
law.20 7 In giving the DOI the responsibility for determining network adequacy,
the legislature sought to "gain the advantage of policy development by
professionals," where it had developed "the rudiments of a solution" to a
problem, so that it20 8could then "turn the program ...over to an agency ...for

implementation."
The requirement of network adequacy in HB 335 is likely to have the most
significant impact on the greatest number of health care consumers of any
provision in the bill.2" While the number of primary care providers in an
HMO's network is one factor in competition between HMOs,210 "the legislature
had limited faith that the marketplace could address" the issue of sufficient
access to all types of health care providers2 1 It was this lack of faith that led the
212
legislature to grant the DOI "broad authority in regard to network adequacy.

202. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.603.1 (Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
203. Mo. REV. STAT. §354.603.2 (Supp. 1999).
204. Mo. REv.

STAT.

§ 354.603.2 (Supp. 1999).

205. An access plan is a description of how an HMO will have an adequate number
and variety of health care providers to meet the needs of its enrollees.
206. KERWIN, supra note 12, at 6.
207. See BONFIELD, supra note 19, at 89.
208. KERWIN, supra note 12, at 11-12.
209. See Thomas D. Bixby, Network Adequacy: The Regulation of HMOs'
Network of Health CareProviders,63 Mo. L. REV. 397, 398 (1998).
210. Id. at 408.
211. Id. at 407.

212. Id.
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The concern about adequate access to health care specialists, as opposed to
primary care providers, was particularly significant.2 13
Among the implementation issues that required resolution by the DOI
during the rulemaking process were: (1) the types of health care providers
included in a network adequacy plan, (2) a test to determine that HMOs
contracted with various types of providers within a reasonable distance of
enrollees (geographic access), and (3) a measure designed to ensure that enough
of each type of provider exists to meet the needs of the enrollees.214 Because the
DOI had little expertise in network adequacy, it determined that a participatory
process would be the most efficient and effective method to gain the necessary
understanding of the relevant issues.2" 5
Some interest groups representing specialized health care providers argued
that it was critical for their constituents to be among the types of providers listed
in the network adequacy scheme.2" 6 Their inclusion as a type of provider in the
network adequacy rule was believed to have serious economic consequences.2" 7
While hospitals and primary care providers would certainly be included in the
network adequacy rule, one writer asserted that failure to include one type of
provider in the rule would result in "the exclusion of [those providers]" from
managed care plans. 28 Participants in the process raised little opposition to the
inclusion of these interest groups in the network adequacy rule.219 This may
have resulted from the fact that the rules permitted, rather than required, HMOs
to use certain types of providers,"o or from what was perceived as the more

213. Id. at 408.
214. See supranote 6.
215. See supra note 6. An agency can gain expertise in a variety of ways,
including hiring staff with appropriate background and experience. However, at the time
HB 335 was implemented, few people in the country had expertise in network adequacy
issues, and the DOI did not have positions appropriated by the legislature for such
employees.
216. See, e.g., Letter from Richard D. Watters, Lashly & Baer, on behalf of the
Missouri Nurses Association, to Bill Ackerman, Counsel, Department of Insurance 2
(Dec. 23, 1997) (on file with author) ("We request that [the rule] be amended to expressly
recognize . . .advance practice nurses."); Letter from Terry E. Carlisle, Missouri
Academy of Physician Assistants, to Tom Bixby (Oct. 16, 1997) (on file with author)
("It is very important that [physician assistants] be named" in the rule.); Letter from
William A. Spencer, Executive Director, Missouri Podiatric Association, to Tom Bixby,
Department of Insurance (Sept. 2, 1997) (on file with author) ("It is our firm belief that
podiatry ...should be included in the Managed Care Plan Network Adequacy Model.").
217. See supranote 216.

218. See supranote 216.
219. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6.
220. Mo. CODE REGs. ANN.tit. 20, § 400-7.095(2) (1998). Although the rule
would require listed specialists to be in an HMO's network, there was no requirement
that services provided by such a specialist be covered by the HMO plan: "Network
adequacy standards shall apply only to those services offered under the terms of a health
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3
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important "ratio" issue, discussed infra." In either case, the process failed to
provide the DOI with sufficient expertise or an effective counterbalance to these
special interests. The participatory process did not provide the DOI with
possible disadvantages to the inclusion of these types of providers in the network
adequacy rule.'
Geographic access-the ability to access health care services within a
reasonable distance of one's home-was a significant concern of the legislature
in passing HB 3 3 5 .22 Like the pharmacy provisions of the bill, geographic
access not only increased the administrative costs of HMOs,2 4 but had
implications for the ability of HMOs to negotiate discounts for health care

services.'

This aspect of the rulemaking process for network adequacy,

therefore, provided vell defined arguments for both sides of the issue from
which the DOI could benefit. The industry argued against the "prescriptive
approach" because it "would add unnecessary administrative burdens and costs
...for HMOs. '' 26 However, the legislature argued that the ability of patients to
be able to receive care in their local community, was paramount. 227 Geographic
access proved to be an issue for which the DOI, with input from legislators and
consumer groups, was in a good position to assess the advantages and
disadvantages to consumers of different policy choices." 8
The industry argued that "the Department's current procedures for
reviewing the adequacy of HMO networks ...have worked well to promote
broad access to the full range of primary care and specialty providers for
Therefore, it was argued that the geographic distance
Missouri residents."'
were "unnecessary."" Furthermore, the industry
rule
proposed
limits in the

benefit plan." MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.095(2) (1998). As a result, it was
possible that an HMO would be required to have, for example, chiropractors in a network
without requiring that the HMO make chiropractic care a covered benefit.
221. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph R. Cecil, Executive Director/Chief Operating
Officer, Family Health Partners, to Tom Bixby, Missouri Department of Insurance (Oct.
30, 1997) (on file with author).
222. The Author does not necessarily mean to suggest that including such
providers was a bad policy choice. However, the Author is of the opinion that it was a
less-well-informed policy choice than others made in the process.
223. See Bixby, supra note 209, at 398.
224. Letter from Richard I. Smith, Vice President, Public Policy & Research,
American Association of Health Plans, to Tom Bixby, Director, Division of Consumer
Affairs, Missouri Department of Insurance 9 (Dec. 24, 1997) (on file with author).
225. See Bixby, supra note 209, at 405.
226. Bixby, supra note 209, at 405.
227. See Bixby, supra note 209, at 398.
228. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6.
229. Letter from Richard I. Smith, supra note 224, at 9.
230. Letter from Richard I. Smith, supra note 224, at 9. The proposed (and final)
rule required that an HMO contract with various types of health care providers so as to
ensure that most enrollees were within a specified distance from such a provider. For
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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argued that the geographic requirements failed to "provid[e] any clear benefit to
Missouri residents." 1 Ultimately, this position was viewed as untenable 2 The
DOI presumed that the legislature passed the network adequacy provisions in
order to change the process in place prior to the effective date of HB 335. 2 3 To
maintain the status quo in the face of such legislative action would likely have
subjected the DOI to criticism of agency capture.2 4
The industry also argued that it was necessary for the rule to balance the
patient's need for convenient access to health care providers with the HMO's
ability to negotiate reasonable contracts with health care providers. 5 The
industry was concerned that in areas of the state with limited numbers of health
care providers, if network adequacy requirements were too stringent, they would
be forced to negotiate a contract with one particular health care provider. 6 For
example, if only one hospital in an area met the network adequacy requirements,
an HMO doing business in that area would be required to contract with that
hospital, limiting the HMO's ability to keep its costs reasonable. 7 The
participatory process enabled the DOI to propose, discuss, modify, and
ultimately write exceptions to the general network adequacy rule that provided
HMOs with flexibility 8to negotiate reasonable contracts without leaving HMO
patients unprotected. 2

example, a primary care physician had to be within 30 miles of most enrollees in "basic"
(as distinguished from rural or urban) counties. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 4007.095(2)(A) (1998).
231. Letter from Richard I. Smith, supranote 224, at 9. Consumer groups, on the
other hand, argued that the rule had not gone far enough. They argued that in addition
to distance requirements, the DOI impose time requirements, whereby driving (or public
transit) time be a measure of access to various types of health care providers. Letter from
Joel D. Ferber & Rachel J. Storch, Legal Services of Eastern Missouri, Inc., to Jay
Angoff, Director, Missouri Department of Insurance 1 (Jan. 8, 1998) (on file with
author).
232. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.095 (1998).
233. See Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.095 (1998).
234. See SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 13, at 12.
235. See Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.095 (1998); Letter from Richard
I. Smith, supranote 224, at 9-10.
236. Letter from Richard I. Smith, supranote 224, at 9-10.
237. Letter from Richard I. Smith, supra note 224, at 9-10.
238. For Alternative Compliance Mechanisms, see Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 400-7.095(5) (1998). Examples of exceptions developed to balance competing
interests raised in the participatory process include: "Other Network Adequacy
Standards," MO. CODE BEGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.095(5)(B) (1998) (HMOs that comply
with network adequacy standards established by Medicaid, Medicare, or the Missouri
Consolidated Health Care Plan would be deemed to be in compliance with state
regulations, rather than requiring compliance with both standards); "Noncompetitive
Market Exception for PCPs [Primary Care Providers] and Pharmacies," Mo. CODE BEGS.
ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.095(5)(D) (1998); and "Noncompetitive Market Exception for
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3
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Similarly, the industry argued that it should be allowed to require patients
to travel longer distances when quality of care was clearly an issue. 9 The
industry argued that some hospitals had significantly lower death rates for some
procedures than other hospitals, and that requiring a patient to travel to such a
hospital was in the patient's best interest.20 This argument also resulted in an
exception to the general network adequacy standard. Specifically, if an HMO
could establish that a better health outcome would result, it could send a patient
to a health care provider farther away than would otherwise be allowed, provided
that the patient had no additional expenses.241
In addition to determining the type of providers to include in a network
adequacy plan, and the enrollees' geographic access to those providers, the DOI
was also required to ensure that a sufficient number of each type of provider was
available in an IMO's network to meet the needs of the enrollees.242 Early in
the participatory process, the DOI suggested that the rule establish a
provider/enrollee ratio for each type of provider required by the network
adequacy plan ("ratio approach"). 243 The proposal was based on an academic
study undertaken on behalf of government agencies in Missouri involved in the
health care delivery system.2' The ratio approach was criticized by the industry
2 46
24 s
and too subjective.
and employer groups as being too intrusive
Furthermore, the issue became "fraught with political agenda" when provider
groups lobbied to increase their ratios. 7 For example, chiropractors argued for
26 chiropractors per 100,000 patients, whereas the ratio for

Hospitals and Specialists," MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.095(5)(E) (1998)
(providing a mechanism for adequate networks of health care providers for geographic
areas in which competition between health care providers is limited).
239. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6.
240. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6.
241. See Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.095(5)(C) (1998).
242. Memorandum from Tom Bixby, Missouri Department of Insurance, to
Members of the Network Adequacy Task Force 2 (Aug. 28, 1997) (on file with author).
243. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (Aug. 28, 1997), supra note 242, at 2.
244. See MANAGED HEALTH CARE PLANS, PROPOSED MISSOURI PROVIDER
NETWORK ADEQUACY STANDARDS (Allen Daugird, M.D., M.B.A., Draft No. 3 1996).

The state agencies involved were the Departments of Health, Insurance, and Mental
Health, as well as the Division of Medical Services (Medicaid), and the Missouri
Consolidated Health Care Plan, the health insurance provider for most state employees.
Id.
245. See, e.g., Letter from Michael G. Winter, Executive Director, Missouri
Association of Health Plans, to Tom Bixby, Missouri Department of Insurance 1 (Oct.
1, 1997) (on file with author) ("[T]hese proposed [ratios] are, in our view,
micromanagement of a health plan.").
246. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph R. Cecil, supra note 221, at 1. (The DOI should
not "impose arbitrary and certainly unsubstantiated by objective research staffing ratios
as proposed.").
247. Letter from Joseph R. Cecil, supra note 221, at 1.
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obstetrician/gynecologists was to be 10 per 100,000.8 This struck more than
a few observers as being "obviously a political statement [and] not a reflection
of what [was] needed to care for [enrollees].""'9 Although, the participatory
process brought the DOI volumes of information on the subject, the information
was of a very technical nature for which the DOI lacked expertise.
Furthermore, information gathered by the DOI during the participatory
process soon indicated that the plan was unworkable.' ° The simplistic basis of
the plan required complex modifications to adapt to the variety of payors with
which health care providers contracted, and the different manners in which
HMOs managed careY' First, when establishing a ratio of providers to
enrollees, it became apparent that such a ratio, without more, would not be an
accurate measure of whether patients would have prompt access to health care
providersY 2 A doctor contracting with one HMO might contract with as many

as eight or nine other HMOs, have contracts with a variety of Preferred Provider
Organizations, take any number of patients from self-insured plans, and/or from
MedicareY 3 As a result, having a provider in a network could require that a
provider dedicate all of her time to the HMO's patients, or none of her time.2s4
The alternative, collecting, or requiring HMOs to collect, data concerning how
much time a provider was required to make available to enrollees of a particular
HMO, would be costly and unpopular with both providers and HMOs."
Second, the appropriate ratio was extremely difficult to determine because
of wide variation in patient utilization by health planY6 For example, based on
data submitted to the DOI for two HMOs, the cost of cardiology care varied by
more than ninety percent, dermatology by less than ten percent, and pediatrics
varied by over 2,300%.2 These variances reflect differences in data collection

248. Letter from Joseph R. Cecil, supranote 221, at 1.
249. Letter from Joseph R. Cecil, supra note 221, at 1.

250. Memorandum from Tom Bixby, Missouri Department of Insurance, to
Members of the Network Adequacy Task Force 1 (Oct. 17, 1997) (on file with author).
251. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (Oct. 17, 1997), supranote 250, at 1.
252. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6; Letter from
Michael G. Winter, supranote 245, at 1.
253. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6; Letter from
Michael G. Winter, supranote 245, at 1.
254. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6; Letter from
Michael G. Winter, supranote 245, at 1.
255. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supra note 6; Letter from
Michael G. Winter, supranote 245, at 1.

256. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supra note 6; Letter from
Michael G. Winter, supranote 251, at 1.
257. Letter from Julie Bietsch, Vice President, Provider Affairs, Alliance Blue
Cross Blue Shield, to Tom Bixby, Department of Insurance 2 (Oct. 10, 1997) (on file
with author); Facsimile from Jamie Huether, Group Health Plan, to Tom Bixby 2 (Sept.
23, 1997) (on file with author).
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procedures," but also differences in "how care is managed." ' 9 Different health
plans, it was argued, would provide health care by utilizing different
combinations of providers,.' and a specifically prescribed ratio would inhibit an
HMO's ability to do so in a cost efficient manner.26'
After considerable work in attempting to resolve the ratio problem, the DOI
determined that the ratio had become so watered down as to be meaningless-all
HMOs involved in the process had between three and seven times the providers
necessary to meet the ratio standard.262 Consequently, the DOI decided to
propose a scaled-down network adequacy plan as an interim structure that would
be replaced at a later date by a more comprehensive rule.263 This scaled-down
rule eliminated the controversial "ratio" approach altogether.264
Absent the participatory process, the DOI probably would have proposed
some ratio component in the network adequacy rule. After learning of the
problems detailed above, the ratio component would have been removed from
the rule during the MoAPA process. This, in turn, would likely have been a
significant enough change in the proposed rule to require the DOI to start the
MoAPA notice and comment process over again, delaying the implementation
265
of the rule, and costing all involved considerable time and money.
IV.

COMMENT

The extensive participatory rulemaking process employed by the DOI in the
implementation of 1iB 335 was extremely valuable to the agency for a variety
of reasons. The process educated DOI staff on details of the credentialing
process, pharmacy operations, and HMO networks. These details were essential
to the development of meaningful, effective rules. Criticism of early DOI
proposals revealed legitimate flaws and allowed the development of solutions to
problems raised. Addressing these problems early in the participatory process
allowed the DOI to avoid the need to start the MoAPA notice and comment
process over when making significant changes to proposed rules.
The participatory process was instrumental in the development of rules that
benefitted the public to a greater extent than a less-involved process would have.
For example, the Quality of Care provision of the network adequacy rule allows

258. Letter from Julie Bietsch, supranote 257, at 2.
259. Letter from James C. Stutz, Executive Director, St. Louis Area Business
Health Coalition, to Tom Bixby and Marcia (sic) English, Missouri Department of
Insurance 2 (Oct. 3, 1997) (on file with author).
260. Letter from James C. Stutz, supranote 259, at 2.
261. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supranote 6.
262. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (June 27, 1997), supra note 6.
263. Memorandum from Tom Bixby (Oct. 17, 1997), supranote 250, at 1.
264. MO. CODE REGS. ANN.tit. 20, § 400-7.095 (1998).
265. See supranote 6.
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a patient to receive care close to home unless the HMO can demonstrate that the
quality of care received will be enhanced, and the patient will not bear the cost
of being treated farther away from home. 2" Similarly, the process helped the
DOI to balance the cost of care ultimately borne by the public with a patient's
convenient access to health care providers.
Furthermore, the participatory process enabled the DOI to better meet the
legitimate needs of the industry raised during the course of the proceedings. For
example, the process developed a Standardized Credentialing Form that became
a model for use in other states,2 67 as well as reducing the administrative burden
of credentialing on health care providers. However, the process was not without
problems: it was time-consuming, expensive, and contentious. Some issues
raised during the process were not resolved, and the participatory rulemaking
process became the battleground for political conflict that could have been
resolved through the formal MoAPA process with less cost to the agency.
A. Costs andBenefits to the Agency
Where the DOI was called upon to implement the fully developed policy
of the legislature, as with the Standardized Credentialing Form, the participatory
process worked best. The agency gathered and evaluated information essential
to the development of the form much more efficiently than it could otherwise
have done. The task force meetings provided an opportunity for parties in
disagreement over specific terms to negotiate resolutions to their
problems-indeed, the meetings virtually required parties to work out
differences in order to prevent an undesirable format from being adopted. Had
the agency attempted to develop such a form without an extensive participatory
process, the result most likely would have been a form that failed to address the
needs of many in the industry. Once promulgated as a rule, the form would have
been relatively inflexible because any changes would have to go through the
lengthy, MoAPA rulemaking process.
For the implementation oflaws, the participatory process'should generally
prove useful to an administrative agency. When the legislature has established
a policy, and an agency is required to instruct the public on how to comply,
bringing interested parties together helps the agency gather information
necessary for effective implementation. Furthermore, the process creates a
forum for the resolution of problems that arise during the implementation stage.
Where the legislature sets broad goals and requires the agency to prescribe
the details of the law, as with the network adequacy requirements, the
participatory process is extremely useful to the agency. For instance, when
addressing the issue of geographic access to providers, the DOI gathered

266. See CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-7.095(5)(C) (1998).
267. Other states using the Missouri Standardized Credentialing Form as a model
include Kansas, Colorado, and Nebraska. See supranote 166.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3

30

Bixby: Bixby: Participatory Rulemaking in State Government:

2000]

MANAGED CARE R ULEMAKING

extensive information about HMO networks and health care providers, was
presented with competing interests, and was required to balance those interests.
Furthermore, the participatory process provided both the industry and the public
the opportunity to criticize DOI proposals early enough in the process so that the
criticism could be evaluated and taken into account with little cost to the agency.
For example, had the criticism arisen concerning the ratio approach in the formal
MoAPA rulemaking process, dropping the approach would probably have made
the rule significantly different so as to require starting the MoAPA process over
again. Beginning the process anew would have cost the agency, consumers, and
the industry time and money, as well as delayed the implementation of the
legislatively enacted reforms. Nevertheless, the participatory process for
geographic access might have been more valuable to the DOI had the industry
not adopted an "extreme position" designed to protect the narrow interests of
their constituents by arguing that the status quo provided sufficient protection to
patients and no changes were necessary.26 Overall, however, the participatory
process was extremely valuable in that it gave the DOI the opportunity to fashion
reasonable solutions to legitimate problems concerning geographic access issues
in the proposed network adequacy model.
The participatory process was not effective, however, in two aspects of the
DOI's attempt to prescribe the details of the law for network adequacy. First,
where special interest groups representing specialty providers wished to be
included in the network adequacy scheme, the DOI was not presented with
disadvantages of their inclusion, nor did the DOI have the expertise to evaluate
these claims. In this case, the problem may have been overcome by explicitly
asking industry and business groups with concerns about the cost of including
these providers to directly address this issue. While still lacking the necessary
expertise, such an approach would have provided the DOI with a more balanced
perspective.
Second, the participatory process was not able to help the DOI determine
the appropriate ratio for different types of providers. This, however, was not a
failure of the participatory process as much as it was a lack of technical expertise
within the DOI required for this complex policy decision. Determining whether
the ratio of OB/GYNs to patients should be 10:100,000 or 15:100,000, and
whether chiropractors should have a greater (or lesser) ratio is a determination
more appropriate for an expert in public health, not insurance. The DOI properly
decided to avoid making such determinations, and should not attempt to do so
unless it gains the expertise required to evaluate the information presented to the
agency in the participatory process.
A second circumstance in which a participatory process should prove useful
to an agency is where the legislature establishes broad policy goals, and the
agency is required to fill in the details. A participatory process will bring in
information necessary for the agency to have a better grasp on the practical

268. KERNVN, supranote 12, at 115-16.
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application of the statutory scheme, and help the agency to better understand the
implications of its proposed policy choices. Early input for the agency,
particularly in cases involving complicated issues such as network adequacy, can
save a great deal of time by resolving these issues prior to the beginning of the
formal process. When confronted with a situation in which the agency hears
from only one side, it should solicit input from likely opponents. Furthermore,
an agency should be sure to have appropriate expertise to evaluate information
before it attempts to solicit feedback on complex, technical issues.
Where the legislature enacted an ambiguous statute and left it to the agency
to interpret the law, as with the Pharmacy Provisions, the value of the
participatory process is more limited. For the DOI, the participatory process
surrounding the Pharmacy Provisions provided the agency with invaluable
information that was necessary to understand how HMOs and pharmacies
interact. The process also created the opportunity for the interest groups to
resolve their differences on their own. Furthermore, the process enabled the DOI
to be better prepared for possible subsequent legislative and judicial attacks
resulting from the agency's interpretation of the law. However, the time, money,
energy, and political capital expended as a result of the extensive input from
parties concerning the pharmacy issue was a tremendous burden on the DOI.
A better approach for the DOI would have been to have a participatory
process to learn how the IMOs and pharmacies interacted, but to do the
statutory interpretation in a less public forum, perhaps doing no more than
requesting legal opinions on the appropriate interpretation. Although the DOI
was invariably "stuck in the middle" by virtue of its having to determine the
outcome of the controversy, it was not necessary to the resolution of the issue for
the DOI to repeatedly go over the arguments in public hearings and private
meetings. For the interpretation of statutes, the statutory framework of the
MoAPA provides sufficient input for the public, and the courts-which will
ultimately decide on proper statutory interpretation-to provide adequate
protection for interested parties.
A participatory rulemaking process designed to help an agency interpret the
law has valuable aspects, as well as aspects with questionable value. To the
extent that the process provides information useful to understanding the context
of the law, the process is helpful. However, where the process becomes a forum
for opposing sides to describe their version of legislative intent, the cost of the
process rapidly overcomes the benefits.
B. Costs andBenefits to the GeneralPublic
As discussed above, the DOI's implementation of the standardized
credentialing policy of the legislature was more effective and efficient than it
would have been without the extensive participatory process. In the absence of
the process, the DOI may have been required to make several changes through
the formal MoAPA rulemaking process, rather than presenting a largely finished
product at the beginning of that process. Such changes would have been costly
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3
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and fiustrating to both health care providers and HMOs. Although the public-atlarge had little direct stake in the outcome of the rule, the benefits to those in the
credentialing process accrue indirectly to the general- public in the form of
reduced costs.
When the DOI was charged with prescribing the details of the network

adequacy provisions of HB 335, the public again benefitted from the
participatory rulemaling process. The process effectively pressured the DOI to
balance the cost associated with a detailed access plan with the inclusion of more
types of providers and additional standards for an adequate network of health
care providers. Similarly, as a result of the participatory process, the DOI
factored quality of care issues into its formula for an adequate network of health
care providers. Quality of care, cost of care, and access to a variety of types of
a sufficient number of health care providers, are all aspects of health insurance
coverage that are important to the public. Requiring the DOI to balance these
factors in a public, open manner, resulted in a rule that was better balanced than
was likely to have occurred in the absence of a participatory process. However,
the inclusion of chiropractors and podiatrists, as well as other types of providers,
in the definition of an adequate network may not be warranted strictly on a
policy basis. The failure to include some measure of a sufficient number of
particular types of providers, such as the ratio approach, was due to a lack of
expertise on the part of the DOI, rather than a failure of the participatory process.
The participatory rulemaking process was least helpful in regard to the
DOI's interpretation of the pharmacy provisions of HIB 335. Although the
participatory process benefitted the public to the extent that it was useful to the
DOI in gathering information necessary to write a comprehensible, effective
rule, it provided no benefit to the public in helping the agency interpret the
statute. Giving special interest groups prolonged and repeated opportunities to
influence an agency's interpretation of a statute-even where, as here, the effort
did not affect the outcome-does nothing to improve the rule for the public.
C. Costs andBenefits to the RegulatedIndustry
Finally, in some respects, the participatory process benefitted the regulated
industry. IMOs were required by the legislation to use a standardized
credentialing form.269 Consequently, their participation in the drafting of the
form made the requirement considerably less burdensome on them, but no less
effective in reducing costs for the physicians and other health care providers it
was intended to benefit. Absent the participatory process, it is likely that a
standardized credentialing form less acceptable to the managed care industry
would have been generated in the rulemaking process. This, in turn, would have
made the implementation of the law less effective: HMOs would either be
denied the ability to collect information they desired, or would have to do so in

269. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.442.1(15) (Supp. 1999).
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violation of the law. Since the purpose of the law was to restrict the manner in
which information was collected, not which information was collected, this
would have produced an undesirable result. Similarly, the industry's ability to
convince the DOI of the necessity of taking into account quality of care and cost
issues benefitted the industry by enabling them to keep costs down, while
promoting quality health care.
However, the industry's participation was costly in terms of industry staff
time, legal analysis, and other expenses."' This was particularly true for the
pharmacy provisions, where the interpretation of the statute was the DOI's
objective. In such cases, a participatory process should be used only sparingly,
if at all, because the agency's interpretation should not be unduly affected by
special interests. Providing the opportunity for such participation, without
yielding to the special interests' conclusions, was costly to the regulated
industry, and provided no significant benefit in return.
V.

CONCLUSION

A broad-based, participatory rulemaking process, entered into prior to the
formal MoAPA rulemaking process can be extremely beneficial to a government
agency. Furthermore, such a process has the potential to benefit the public and
the regulated industry. The advantages of the process include providing
information and understanding of the proposal's impact, as well as providing
critical analysis to proposed policy choices early in the development process.
The participatory process furthers the goals of "comprehensive rationality" by
enabling the agency to consider a wide array of options, and helps the agency to
evaluate the alternatives and select the best alternative from the options
considered.27'
Related to this is the possibility that in an informal process of bargaining
between interested parties, an amicable resolution to some of the problems faced
by an agency in the rulemaking process may be reached. Such a process helps
give credibility to rules, and prevents the perception of agency capture.
Moreover, a participatory process may help prevent an agency from
promulgating rules that require revision soon after publication. Such a process
can also prevent the need for going through the formal MoAPA rulemaking
process to correct significant problems with a proposal. After discovering
problems with the agency's initial approach, the participatory process can

270. The majority of the more than three hundred people on the DOI mailing list
were industry representatives, as were the majority of people at most meetings, which
would range in size from 20 to 80 people. In addition to this participation, the industry
provided formal legal analysis for the pharmacy provisions and other aspects of HB 335,
and incurred travel, telephone, postage, data processing, and other costs while

participating in the process.
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thereby save the agency and the regulated industry time and money, as well as
enable legislative reforms to be implemented more quickly and effectively.
A participatory rulemaking process is clearly helpful where an agency is
asked to implement a rule for which the legislature has set out a clear policy.
Such a process is also useful where the legislature establishes broad policy goals

and leaves the task of prescribing the details of the law to the agency. However,
where an agency's only function is to interpret what the legislature meant by a
particular provision, a participatory process has less value. Although there
remains value in collecting information to better understand the context of the
statute, for purposes of ascertaining the meaning of the statute, traditional modes
of statutory construction may prove to be more valuable than relying on parties
with vested interests in the outcome of the interpretation.
There are three important caveats to the recommended use of an extensive,
participatory process in the development of proposed rules. First, where an
agency is requiredto take certain steps to promulgate a rule, there is always the
danger that agency personnel will make those steps nothing more than "stylized
'
rituals."272
If this is the case, the purpose of the participatory process will be

defeated. Simply requiring or establishing such a process will not, in itself,
ensure that better rules will be the result.
Second, broad-based participation is important to the value of the process.
Where special interests dominate the process, it is important to ensure that
alternative points of view come to the fore-even if it becomes necessary to
solicit them. Without a broad base of participants, an agency will be unable to
bring conflicting interests to bear on one another, thereby minimizing the value
of the participatory process. Finally, the participatory process is not helpful
where the agency lacks the expertise to properly evaluate highly technical
information. The agency should either forego such rulemaking, or develop or
obtain sufficient expertise before undertaking such a venture.
The DOI's experiment with a broad-based, participatory rulemaking
process in the implementation of HB 335 was successful in terms of providing
the DOI with better information, critical analysis, and legitimacy. Such a
process should be undertaken by agencies considering the promulgation of rules,
particularly where the rules are designed to implement the law orprescribethe
details of the law.
THOMAS D. BIXBY
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